Importance of external and internal collaboration | ZDNet
External and internal collaboration should demonstrate business impact across Collaborating externally builds relationships with consumers. Request PDF on ResearchGate | The Relationship between Internal and External Cooperation: Literature Review and Propositions | Over time, the management. This article examines the underlying rationale behind successful intra- and interfirm relationships. Relationships based on equity and social exchange are.
Blanshard, approaching the matter epistemologically rather than metaphysically, brought forward a battery of arguments designed to show that the acceptance of this distinction was the result of a mistaken Humean analysis of knowledge. By weakening this distinction and claiming that causal necessity by virtue of which A had P could not be separated from logical necessity by virtue of which A was self-identicalhe was able to argue that what Moore had viewed as a simple confusion was at worst a confused formulation of a vitally important insight.
In examining this second argument, it will again be convenient to look to its critics rather than to its defenders. Ernest Nagelin a critique of Blanshard's The Nature of Thought titled "Sovereign Reason," restates and criticizes Blanshard's views on internal relations in a way that brings out very clearly their connection with Blanshard's treatment of causality. Blanshard, in turn, has replied to Nagel in the later chapters particularly Ch.
A summary of the Blanshard-Nagel controversy will serve two purposes. It will trace the most recent line of defense adopted by defenders of the view that all relations are internal, and it will lead us to an understanding of why some philosophers claim that no relations are internal. Blanshard puts forward, and Nagel quotes as a basis for criticism, the following version of the doctrine that all relations are internal.
Despite the ambiguities detected by Ewing, Blanshard holds that "the principal meaning" of this doctrine is clear and formulates it as follows: Nature of Thought, Vol.
Nagel bases his general objections to Blanshard on the claim that this is a perverse use of "nature," since "it is quite clear that just what characters are included in an individual, and just where the boundaries of an individual are drawn, depend on decisions as to the use of language. These decisions, though motivated by considerations of practical utility, are logically arbitrary " p. Nagel, in other words, is saying that "the nature of X " consists of just those properties of X whose absence would cause us to cease using "X " to refer to X and that the selection of these properties is determined not by empirical study but by convention.
The list of such properties is finite, whereas the list of the properties of X is potentially infinite. Nagel thus adopts what has become the standard empiricist view, first clearly formulated by A. Ayer in "Internal Relations," that to determine which properties of X are internal to it is merely a matter of determining which propositions about X are analytic and that determining this is simply a matter of consulting linguistic usage.
To urge that the nature of a thing includes all its properties would, given this view, be to urge that all propositions about X are analytic. Both Nagel and Ayer treat this conclusion as a reductio ad absurdum. In examining Blanshard's arguments, Nagel first takes up Blanshard's form of the argument from the nature of self-identity and disposes of it by drawing what is essentially Moore's distinction between the logically contingent fact that A has P and the logically necessary fact that anything that does not have P cannot be identical with A.
His defense of this distinction is simply that unless the distinction is drawn, we shall wind up with the view that "the nature of X " is identical with X itself and thus that "the nature of a thing, like the thing itself, would be something that is in principle indefinable and could not therefore be made the basis for bringing into systematic order any of the characters which the thing displays" p.
But from Blanshard's point of view, this reply begs the question, since Blanshard would be quite willing to say that the nature of any given particular is indeed indefinable by finite minds. For Blanshard the question is merely pushed back to the issue of whether a satisfactory epistemology can be constructed on the basis of the view that all logical necessity has its source in linguistic convention.
But this latter issue is just the issue of whether causal relationships which are agreed on all sides to be matters not of convention but of empirical inquiry can, in the last analysis, be held to be distinct from logical relationships.
If they cannot, then it would seem fair to say that although we must unfortunately work with the commonsense distinctions between necessary and contingent truths, essence and accident, physical and logical necessity, and the like, these distinctions are nevertheless mere pragmatic makeshifts pertaining, in Bradleian terminology, to Appearance rather than to Reality.
To invoke them to is to attend not to how things are but merely to how we are forced by the limitations of our minds and of our everyday language to talk about them. Thus the battle between Blanshard and Nagel is truly joined only when Nagel takes up the question whether "logical necessity is involved in causal relations.
The first is that causal relations must be analyzed either in terms of "mere regularity of sequence" or in terms of "entailment. But the entailment view is just that "A causes B " is a statement about a logical relation between A and B.
Now if as is not implausible all true relational propositions about particulars are propositions that are true in virtue of causal relations between the particulars mentioned in these propositions, then it follows that all particulars are connected to all others by logical relations and that every such proposition would be seen by omniscience to entail a logical truth about every such particular. Nagel has two objections to this argument. First, the "regularity" and "entailment" views do not exhaust the available analyses of causality; second, "the entailment view contributes nothing toward advancing the aims of specific inquiries into the causal dependencies of physical nature.
Blanshard need merely insist that regularity provides evidence of an underlying entailment but that the regularity and the entailment must not be confused. Blanshard offers no reply to Nagel's first objection, but one suspects that he would argue that all proposed via media analyses of causality in fact boil down to one of the two alternatives he has suggested.
Even if this point is granted to Blanshard, however, the whole question of the validity of his attack on the regularity theory remains. We must leave the topic with the remark that Blanshard can, in attacking this theory, take full advantage of the embarrassment encountered by Rudolf CarnapNelson Goodman, and others in their attempts to construct an inductive logic on the basis of Neo-Humean "regularities.
Feyerabend, and others has made it apparent that the distinction between matters of convention and matters of fact is not so clear as Hume and the early positivists believed. This recent work is closely connected with W.
Quine 's skepticism about the analytic-synthetic distinction and related work in the philosophy of language. It is perhaps not too much to say that empiricism is presently in a state of crisis and that the crisis revolves precisely around the validity of the distinctions that empiricists have traditionally invoked against the thesis of the internality of all relations.
We must conclude that the question of the validity of Blanshard's first form of the argument from the nature of causality must remain undecided until these issues have been further clarified.
Before leaving the Blanshard-Nagel controversy, however, we must take up the second of Blanshard's arguments in favor of the view that logical necessity is involved in causation.
This argument is that philosophical reflection upon the nature of causality leads us to conclude that to say that a produces x in virtue of being a and yet that, given a, x might not follow, is inconsistent with the laws of identity and contradiction. Of course if a were a cluster of qualities abstracted from their relations, and its modes of causal behaviour were another set conjoined with the former externally, then one could deny the latter and retain the former with perfect consistency.
But we have seen that when we say a causes x we do not mean that sort of conjunction; we mean an intrinsic relation, i. And to assert that a 's behaviour, so conceived, could be different while a was still the same would be to assert that something both did and did not issue from the nature of a.
At this point, therefore, Nagel returns to his general line of attack on Blanshard's formulation of the thesis of the internality of all relations and argues that what Blanshard says here is true only if "the nature of X " is defined as "all the properties of X," a definition that, in Nagel's eyes, is both idiosyncratic and such as to trivialize Blanshard's claim. The effectiveness of Nagel's reply can be judged only in the light of a general theory about the relation between thought, language, and reality.
For, here again, Nagel is taking for granted the view that whether a given property is included within a thing's nature is a question about our language, rather than a question to be settled by further inquiry about the thing itself. Just as judgment of the validity of the first form of Blanshard's argument from the nature of causality must be postponed until certain general philosophical issues have been at least clarified, so also judgment of the validity of the second form of this argument must be deferred until questions about the standard empiricist doctrine that all "essences" are "nominal" and that "real essence" is an incoherent notion are settled.
For Blanshard can insist that Nagel has begged these latter questions. In Reason and Analysis we find Blanshard arguing that Nagel's view that decisions about what characters are included in an individual are "logically arbitrary" leads to the view that, for example, Socrates's snub-nosedness is as good a candidate for an essential property of Socrates as his philosopherhood.Transform Your Relationship - Part 1: External vs Internal Quest
Blanshard thinks this a reductio ad absurdumbut this rebuttal, once again, merely moves the argument one step further back. Nagel's point is not that we arbitrarily select which characteristics of an individual shall count as essential but that the criteria of selection are pragmatic, dictated by our present interests and the modes of classification that we have, in the past, found it convenient to adopt.
Nagel would say that a choice about linguistic usage, which is, from a practical point of view, far from arbitrary, is nonetheless logically arbitrary, in the sense that a language with alternative conventions is, though inconvenient, perfectly possible.
Blanshard's basic disagreement with Nagel consists in his view that such pragmatic considerations are not the last word and his insistence that the goal of thought is the discovery of real essences. Such real essences would be discovered by discovering the chains of entailment that connect all the various universals that characterize and, in Blanshard's metaphysics, constitute a particular.
Relations, Internal and External | misjon.info
In Blanshard's view, to say that analytic propositions are true by convention is thoroughly misleading, for such conventions are the results of attempts to discover such entailments. For Blanshard the identification of the nature of X with X itself, and of both with the totality of properties that characterize X, and of all of these with X -as-known-by-an-ideal-knower one who could grasp the entailments between all of these propertiesis not as it is for Nagel a series of confusions but is forced upon us by an analysis of what we mean by "knowing X.
This concerns the nature and knowledge of universals. Blanshard views a particular as a congeries of universals and views the internal relations between particulars as reflecting the internal relations holding between the universals that constitute them.
Such knowledge would obviously fall far short of telling us about the relations in which that particular stands to other particulars. For Blanshard, however, universals have natures that are not known to those who merely know the meanings of the words that signify those universals.
To know the nature of a universal "fully and as it really is" would involve knowing its relations to all the universals that are exemplified in all the particulars that exemplify the first universal. Thus, to know any universal "fully and as it really is" would be possible only for omniscience, just as, and for the same reasons that, knowledge of the real essence of a particular would be possible only for omniscience.
Thus, resolution of the controversy about internal relations would require, at a minimum, a decision concerning the adequacy of a nominalistic account of universals. Blanshard views the current antagonism toward idealism and a fortiori toward the thesis of the internality of all relations as largely a result of analytic philosophy's "systematic confusion between thought and language," a confusion that leads philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein to hold 1 that the notion of having a concept or being acquainted with a universal prior to the use of language is incoherent, and 2 that the notion of detecting internal relations between universals apart from considerations of linguistic usage is a relic of a radically mistaken analysis of mental events.
If these latter tenets are accepted, clearly Blanshard's arguments cannot even get off the ground. Once again, we must conclude that the thesis of the internality of all relations cannot be profitably discussed until one has taken sides on the most fundamental issues in contemporary philosophy.
The View that no Relations are Internal When we turn to the view that no relations are internal, we turn from a controversy that reflects profound underlying disagreements concerning the analysis of knowledge to a controversy about much narrower issues concerning the analysis of naming and predication. Those who say that no particular is internally related to any other particular insist that the only entities that can be internally related to one another are characteristics of particulars.
Following to its logical conclusion Nagel's claim that the assignment of a given description to a given particular is "logically arbitrary," they hold that to say that X would "not be what it is" unless it had P is merely to say that the particular could not be characterized in a given way unless it had this property. But since the particular is sublimely indifferent to how it is characterized, it "is what it is" regardless of whatever properties it may have.
To speak of "logically necessary conditions for the self-identity of X " is, at best, to speak elliptically of "logically necessary conditions for correctly describing X as a K," where "K " signifies some kind of thing of which X is a representative, or more generally of "logically necessary conditions for correctly describing X as C," where "C " is some general characterization. The whole notion of "properties and, a fortiori, relations such that X would cease to be what it is if they were removed" is thus either incoherent or misleading.
For "being what it is" is simply too ambiguous a notion; there are indefinitely many kinds to which X belongs and indefinitely many characterizations that apply to it. To philosophers who deny the internality of any relations, the whole notion of internal properties and relations is an unfortunate vestige of the Aristotelian notion that there are real essences of particulars to be discovered by empirical inquiry.
These philosophers heartily agree with the seventeenth-century rationalists, and with Blanshard, that any Aristotelian attempt to divide intrinsically essential and intrinsically accidental properties is foolish.
But whereas Blanshard, sticking to the quest for real essences, insists that this point merely shows that the real essence of an object must include all its properties, these philosophers take the point to show the incoherence of the notion of "real essence" and the notion of "internal property.
If we say that common sense holds that there are both particulars and properties of particulars, then we may say that common sense holds that each particular stands in a necessary relation to some of its properties and in a contingent relation to others.
Blanshard dissolves the particular into a congeries of properties, and, because he believes a that properties qua universals have intrinsic natures to be discovered by inquiry other than inquiry into linguistic usage and b that such inquiry would, in principle, discover relations of entailment between all possible properties of all possible particulars, he holds that a particular stands in a necessary relation to all its properties. Philosophers who deny both doctrines and who assert c that "logical necessity" can only characterize relationships between universals, naturally emerge with the conclusion that the whole notion of logically necessary relations between particulars and their properties must be discarded.
To put it picturesquely, Blanshard thinks that the dissolution of the traditional essence-accident distinction leaves us with the particular as a node in a network of internal relations between universals. His opponents think that this dissolution leaves us with "bare" particulars on the one hand particulars that could logically have any properties and with a network of entailments between universals on the other a network that is, however, much "looser" than Blanshard's, since between most universals no relations of entailment exist.
So there could be no such dispute as to whether this's being this does or does not depend on its being in one or other of its relations. For example, it is misleading to call "Socrates was a Greek philosopher" analytic, for what this statement expresses is either 1 the contingent fact that certain features snub-nosedness, being married to Xanthippe, and so on were compresent with certain others being Greek, being a philosopheror 2 the contingent fact that the word Socrates is used to refer to an individual who exhibited certain features.
Even among philosophers who both reject a and b and accept chowever, this general conclusion has been a matter of debate. In what follows, we shall consider an attempt to avoid the conclusion that there can be no analytic propositions that ascribe properties to particulars and an attempt to avoid the extreme position that no relations are internal to particulars by providing a "rational reconstruction" of the commonsense view.
Such attempts are motivated, at least in part, by philosophical discomfort over the notion of "bare particulars. Although the realistic bent of contemporary analytic philosophy makes philosophers hesitate to accept the Bradleian-Blanshardian view that the whole category of plural "particulars" belongs to Appearance rather than to Reality, it nevertheless seems that having only bare particulars would be as bad as having no particulars at all.
Sprigge notes that the strength of the Rylean position lies in the fact that in sentences expressing particular propositions where the subject word is a name, the subject word has no connotation.
Therefore no predicate word can have a connotation which is incompatible with the connotation of the subject word. But a subject-predicate sentence could only express a necessary proposition if the connotation of the subject word were incompatible with the connotation of the negation of the predicate word.
Having been thus identified," he continues, "as answering to that description, is it not in effect defined as the thing having those properties, which properties therefore it necessarily has? In other words, proper names could not be used unless their users could identify their referents, and how could the users do this save by having a description in mind?
Must we not say that the notion that the logician's dogma that "proper names do not connote" is true only of such Russellian "logically proper names" as "this" which cannot be used save in the presence of their referents?
Sprigge replies to this point by granting it but noting also that since the same particular can be identified by an indefinitely wide range of different descriptions, the point is useless if one is trying to defend the notion of internal properties. In the case of a predicate, rough agreement on criteria for its application is required if the term is to play a useful role. But there seems nothing to prevent every speaker of the language from having a different set of procedures for identifying a particular while nevertheless using the same proper name for it.
Too many connotations are, so to speak, as bad as no connotation at all for purposes of formulating necessary truths. If we follow Sprigge here, we need not be troubled by the spectacle of bare particulars. Every particular we refer to will always be dressed in some description or other, so we need not worry about how they look when undressed.
But since each particular can be dressed up in so many ways, we are as far as ever from understanding what an "internal property" might be, unless we relativize the notion and say that certain properties are internal to X relative to a person S whose personal criteria for identifying X include the presence of these properties. Relativizing the notion in this way is, in essence, the basis for Sprigge's "reconstruction" of the notion of internal property.
As a sample of the sort of intuition upon which the commonsense distinction between internal and external properties is based, he notes that even though we are driven by the Rylean reasoning outlined above to call all subject-predicate statements about particulars synthetic, we find it hard to imagine the falsehood of, for example, "Scott was, at some time in his life, a man. Sprigge proposes that we simply face up to the fact that there is a class of propositions that, if we must choose between calling them synthetic or analytic, must be called synthetic, even though they do not have imaginable contradictories.
Specifically, they are such that no program of empirical inquiry could be formulated that would lead us to decide between them and their contradictories.
The point is most effectively made in the following passage: To ask whether a thing could have been quite different, from what it is, whether Scott could actually have had all the properties of Handel, is on a different level. The questions we have just been asking are all to some degree requests for further descriptions of Scott.
But the present question is not one that calls for any investigation of Scott, and it is difficult to accept that a question which calls for no investigation of Scott, to which nothing about Scott is relevant, is really about Scott. I suggest that a property is internal to a particular to the extent that no information about that particular is conveyed by one who says that it might have lacked that property.
I think that the distinction between internal and external properties is not exact. Hence it is relevant to apply external market strategies for internal market as well. Therefore, internal customer relationship is divided into three parts Employees are considered a customer of an organization Employees are customer and supplier of each other Functional departments are customer and supplier of each other Organizations craft their strategies taking into the account the external market.
But along the way they assume that all the employee are also aware of these strategies. However, in reality employee may be aware of the organization overall objective and mission, but may not be fully aware of specific directions in challenging times.
Hence it becomes very important to treat the employee as customer of an organization. But the concept of bringing external marketing tools upon internal market may not always work. The condition or state of the internal market is way different compared to the external market. The company is not trying differentiation techniques here but rather communicating its philosophy and strategies to prepare employee in successfully facing the external market.
Organizations encourage employees to take a view that they exist to serve each other. The focus is to ensure that employee across departments operate in smooth and efficient manner. This will help the organization deliver total quality management.
Therefore, every employee performs his or her duty in such a way that it does not create any issues or affects the quality. Employees are customers of each other is very similar to assembly type manufacturing, if a person fails to do his party correctly eventually the cascading effect will bring the whole process to halt.
The final aspect of the internal market is the relationship between different functional departments.
Many organizations create regulative systems to deal with functional departments. This has led to development of the concept of internal profit and cost centers. In order to have efficiency, organization split operations into separate business unit or strategic business unit. Here each unit has its own internal targets it has to achieve to drive overall business profits.
Employee-external customer relations Organizations by providing value want to create a long term and loyal customer. This value can be created in a way of differentiating. Therefore, it is important for employees to speak to a customer is single language and work towards the same goal. Thus, all departments need to function with the single objective of providing customer satisfaction.
But not all the functions or departments have full engagement with customers.